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Abstract The ability to control impulsive behaviour has
been studied in animals with a standard test in which sub-
jects need to choose the smaller of two food items in order
to receive the larger one (reverse reward contingency). As a
variety of mammals that have been tested so far (mostly
primates) have great diYculties to solve the task, it has
been proposed that it is generally cognitively demanding.
However, according to an ecological approach to cognition,
a species’ ability to solve the task should not depend on its
general cognitive abilities but on whether its ecology
causes selective pressure on the ability to restrain foraging
behaviour. We tested this hypothesis using the cleaner
wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus), a Wsh species that feeds
against its preference in nature when engaging in cleaning
interactions with so called ‘client Wsh’. None of the eight
tested individuals learned to choose a non-preferred item
after 200 trials. In a subsequent test, one subject learned to
respond correctly in a large or none contingency task (only
the choice of the small food was rewarded). After a short
re-experience treatment, this individual learned to solve the
reverse reward task after 30 trials. In conclusion, we did not
Wnd support for the general idea that interactions with cli-
ents prepared cleaners to quickly solve a reverse reward
test. However, the results suggest that the potential to solve
a reverse reward contingency may not be restricted to mam-
mals but could be present also in a Wsh species in which the
problem of choosing a non-preferred food over a preferred
one is an ever present challenge in nature.
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Introduction
The ability to control impulsive behaviour in order to
acquire an overall long term beneWt has received a large
amount of interest in studies on human and non-human ani-
mal behaviour (Mischel et al. 1989; Genty et al. 2004;
Abeyesinghe et al. 2005; Murray et al. 2005; Genty and
Roeder 2006; Wittmann and Paulus 2008). Impulse control
may be advantageous in order to withhold an action that
would have deleterious consequences in the future. Individ-
uals may proWt from impulse control behaviour by avoiding
unbeneWcial temporal discounting (Stevens and Hauser
2004; Abeyesinghe et al. 2005; Stevens et al. 2005;
Wittmann and Paulus 2008) or when feeding against a pref-
erence (Genty and Roeder 2006; Wittmann and Paulus
2008). The ability to control impulsive behaviour should be
particularly important in cooperative interactions, i.e. when
investments in others yield a net gain in the future compared
to not investing (Stevens et al. 2005; Bergmüller et al.
2007a; West et al. 2007; Bshary and Bergmüller 2008).
Studies on impulse control in humans have aimed at inves-
tigating the age at which children are able to choose a delayed
large reward over an immediate small reward (Russell et al.
1991). This ability has been suggested to be critical for the
development of an awareness of self and has hence been
linked to self-control in humans. As such self control appears
to be crucial for the quality of human interactions, many non-
human species that have been studied in this context have
been primates, possibly reXecting an anthropocentric
approach that seeks to understand human cognitive abilities
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Bshary et al. 2007). In contrast, the ecological approach to
cognition proposes that we should Wnd certain cognitive
capabilities including impulse control in those species that
need to solve similar problems in their natural environment
(Shettleworth 1994; Kamil 1998; Bshary et al. 2002).
A paradigm that has been widely used to study impulse
control across species has been the so called ‘reverse reward
contingency task’. In this task, a subject is typically shown
two diVerent quantities of food. When the subject reaches or
points towards one quantity, the non-selected quantity is
given as the reward. Many species such as chimpanzees, Pan
troglodytes (Boysen and Berntson 1995), Japanese macaques,
Macaca fuscata (Silberberg and Fujita 1996), squirrel mon-
keys, Saimiri sciureus (Anderson et al. 2000), cottontop tama-
rins, Saguinus oedipus (Kralik et al. 2002), rhesus macaques,
Macaca mulatta (Murray et al. 2005) and two species of pros-
imians, black and brown lemurs, Eulemur fulvus and E. mac-
aco (Genty et al. 2004) showed an initial preference for the
larger quantity of food. Such discrimination between two
quantities of food could also be shown in red-backed sala-
manders (Plethodon cinereus) (Uller et al. 2003). However,
these species did not succeed in spontaneously selecting the
smaller reward in order to receive the larger one. In a few
other species, subjects managed to maximise their reward by
choosing the smaller reward. Orang-utans, Pongo pygmaeus
(Shumaker et al. 2001) did so, but without showing an initial
preference for the large reward. Rhesus macaques learned to
consistently select the smaller reward but only after
180–2,800 trials, while in sea lions (Zalophus californianus)
3 of 4 individuals succeeded just after 80–150 trials (Genty
and Roeder 2006). Mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus lunula-
tus) mastered the test without procedural modiWcations (e.g.
such as the large-or-none contingency, see below) and were
able to transfer this ability to novel pairs of arrays with diVer-
ent quantities of food (Albiach-Serrano et al. 2007).
Given that other complex cognitive abilities including
numerical skills, symbolic representation, and other higher-
order information processing capacities had already been
shown in chimpanzees, failure in the reverse reward test
was especially surprising in the initial study in chimpanzees
(Boysen and Berntson 1995). As a result, many subsequent
studies focused on developing procedures that could over-
come the problem of failure in this task. In some species
that failed to choose the non-preferred reward in order to
obtain the preferred one, cues such as Arabic numerals for
chimpanzees and colour cues for cottontop tamarins associ-
ated with the two quantities of food enabled the species to
succeed (Boysen and Berntson 1995; Kralik et al. 2002).
DiVerences in performance when testing the subjects with
food only or with Arabic numerals have been interpreted to
result from a conXict between an associative disposition to
select the smaller reward in order to obtain the large one
and the intrinsic features of the food reward, which could
be removed by using symbols (Boysen et al. 1996; Boysen
et al. 1999). Also, in a diVerent procedure, the so called
large-or-none contingency facilitated subsequent success in
the reverse reward contingency. In this procedure, individu-
als receive the large reward when choosing the small
reward, but do not receive any reward when choosing the
large reward. Several species succeeded in choosing the
small reward in this procedure and continued to do so, even
when the reverse reward procedure was reapplied (Silberberg
and Fujita 1996; Anderson et al. 2000; Genty et al. 2004).
The large-or-non procedure appears to facilitate choosing
against a preference because it increases the costs of choos-
ing the large reward which is not rewarded.
Here we investigated the ecological approach to cogni-
tion by testing a Wsh species that is phylogenetically distant
from humans, but that has been selected for to feed against
its preference in nature. We predict this should translate into
the ability to succeed in a reverse reward contingency task.
Cleaner wrasses (Labroides dimidiatus) feed on parasites
but prefer mucus which they obtain by biting so called client
Wsh (Grutter and Bshary 2003). This results in a conXict of
interests between cleaners and clients: clients visit cleaners
at their stations in order to get their parasites removed, but
cleaners prefer the mucus they obtain by biting cleaners. As
clients punish non-cooperative (i.e. biting) cleaners by leav-
ing the cleaning station or attacking (punishing) the cleaner
(Bshary and Grutter 2002a; Bshary and SchäVer 2002),
cleaners adjust their behaviour and feed on the parasites they
obtain from clients (Grutter 1996; Bshary and Grutter
2002b). Several laboratory experiments show that cleaners
can easily learn to feed against their preference if this allows
them to continue with foraging (Bshary and Grutter 2005;
Bshary and Grutter 2006). This foraging behaviour results in
a cooperative interaction under natural conditions. The
cleaners’ ability to feed against their preference suggests
that they are capable of a speciWc form of impulse control.
This situation provides the ideal opportunity to test the
cleaners for their ability to choose against their preference in
a reverse reward contingency task. The ecological approach
leads us to predict that cleaner wrasses should be able to
choose against their preference in order to get the preferred
resource, while the prediction of an anthropocentric
approach would be that cleaners will fail the task.
Methods
The study was carried out in the lab at the University of
Neuchâtel, Switzerland. We used eight wild caught Labro-
ides dimidiatus that originated from the Philippines (Island
Luzon near Legaspi) and were directly imported to Switzer-
land in February 2006. The Wsh were kept individually in123
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Wlled with water. Water conditions were kept similar across
all tanks as all aquaria were connected via a Xow through
system that pumped water from a large cleaning tank (a
160 £ 80 £ 60 cm tank containing pieces of hard corals
(Scleractinia) served as natural Wlter) into the single tanks.
The water was pumped into the experimental tanks and
Xowed passively back to the cleaning tank. With this sys-
tem the nitrite concentration was kept to a minimum
(always below 0.3 mg/l). Each tank contained an air supply
and a commercial aquarium heater (Eheim, Jäger 125 W for
200 l tanks). Water salinity was kept at a speciWc gravity of
1.025 § 0.005 at a temperature of 25 § 1°C. The pH
ranged between 8.1 and 8.4. Partial water changes were
performed monthly with a commercial marine salt water
mixture (Aquamedic). Several small polyvinyl pipes
(10–15 cm long and 2.5 cm diameter) served as shelter for
the Wsh. The subjects were fed daily while conducting the
experiments (mashed shrimp and Wsh Xakes) and after the
experiments had been completed in the afternoon (mashed
shrimps, krill, mysis, artemia or commercial Wsh tropical
Xakes (Tetramin)).
Experiments
The experiments were carried out in May–August 2006 and
were conducted in the aquaria were the Wsh were kept.
Before the start of the experiments, the Wsh were trained to
feed from a Plexiglas plate as a substitute for the client Wsh
that serve as food source in nature. Each aquarium was
divided into two compartments which were separated by an
opaque partition. The partition could be closed or opened
by pulling up the partition (Fig. 1.). All eight subjects were
tested individually from 8 a.m. till 5 p.m. Trials were per-
formed 5 times in the morning and 5 times in the afternoon.
Reverse reward contingency test
In a reverse reward contingency task individuals are given a
choice between two rewards, one of them less preferred
than the other. As individuals obtain the reward they have
not chosen they need to choose against their preference in
order to succeed in the task. Before start of the experiments
the Wsh were acclimatised to change between the two com-
partments and to feed from PVC plates (7 £ 10 cm) with
mashed shrimp. These plates were used in the experiment
in order to present choices between two quantities or quali-
ties of food.
As we did not know at the onset of the experiments to
which diVerences among the plates or among food types the
Wsh would react best by distinguishing between two types
of reward, we performed four diVerent procedures, each
one with two subjects (Table 1). In three of the four procedures
the individuals were given the choice between a small
reward, i.e. one item with 1 mg of mashed shrimp (the non-
preferred reward) or four item patches of one 1 mg of
shrimp each (the preferred reward). Mashed prawn is very
adhesive and can easily be attached to a Plexiglas plate.
Each food item was attached on a separate white coloured
patch on the plate (i.e. plates with four rewards items had
four white patches, size = 3 £ 3 mm) so the Wsh could dis-
tinguish between the possible choices when entering the
test compartment. In a fourth procedure the Wsh were given
the choice between 1 mg of mashed shrimps or 1 mg of
dried food Xakes mixed with water. Before each trial, the
subjects were gently moved into the back compartment and
the partition was closed (Fig. 1). This way, the subjects
could not observe the preparation for the experiment in the
choice compartment. Two plates with diVerent quantities or
qualities of food were introduced into the test compartment.
The two Plexiglas plates were placed on the left and right of
the dividing white partition wall. A trial started when the
opaque partition was pulled up so the Wsh could move into
the test compartment through a slot. In order to make sure
that the Wsh was swimming in the middle of the aquarium
while choosing a plate, the subjects needed to swim
through a corridor that was created with help of two Plexi-
glas partitions (length 10 cm), before they made a choice.
The Wsh chose one of both rewards when it reached the
dividing white partition between both plates (i.e. it entered
the compartment created by the white partition and the
aquarium wall). In the same moment, the plates were
exchanged (or the Wrst plate was pulled out to release a sec-
ond plate behind, see Table 1) in order to reward them
against their choice (reverse reward).
The plates were positioned at the left or right side of the
aquarium and the position of each plate was randomised
Fig. 1 The experimental aquarium (view from above) was divided
into a back compartment (left) and the test compartment (right) with
help of an opaque PVC partition. Two plates with diVerent quantities
(indicated by the number of white patches) or qualities of food were
introduced into the test compartment. The two Plexiglas plates were
visually separated from each other with help of a dividing white parti-
tion wall in-between the plates. The tested Wsh could move into the test
compartment through a slot followed by a corridor when an opaque
partition in front of the corridor (not displayed) at the side of the back
compartment was pulled up123
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trials at the same side in order to minimise the risk that the
Wsh would develop a side preference). One session consist-
ing of 10 trials was performed per day. In total, 20 sessions
were completed for each individual.
Large-or-none contingency test
All subjects that did not learn to feed against their prefer-
ence in the reverse reward test were subject to a large-or-
none contingency test (Silberberg and Fujita 1996). The
individuals were subjected to a choice between a plate
with the preferred reward (large reward or prawn) and
another plate with a non preferred reward (small reward or
Xakes). The individuals received the preferred reward
when choosing the non-preferred one or no reward when
choosing the preferred reward. This procedure facilitates
learning to choose against a preference, because choosing
the preferred reward is not reinforced. All other aspects of
the procedure were performed in the same way as
described above in the reverse reward task. One session
consisting of ten trials was conducted once per day with
each subject for up to a maximum of 30 sessions or until
the individual had learned (i.e. three successive sessions in
which the individual was choosing in at least eight of ten
trials the plate without reward). Binomial tests were car-
ried out for the Wrst 50 trials and the last 50 trials in order
to determine changes in choice behaviour due to the con-
tingency of the task.
Return to the reverse-reward contingency test
Individuals who were successful in the large-or-none con-
tingency test, were again subjected to a reverse reward con-
tingency task. Before, however, they were Wrst subjected to
a re-experience procedure. This was done so the subjects
would not simply continue to avoid the preferred item after
the large-or-non contingency task. The re-experience was
given by presenting the two rewards (the preferred and the
non-preferred) on two plates simultaneously so the subjects
could experience again the two possible rewards. During
the re-experience procedure the Wsh could feed on both
plates without any interference for 10 times in total. After
the re-experience, the Wsh were once again subjected to the
reverse reward contingency task for ten sessions with ten
trials per session.
Statistical analysis
All tests were performed with SPSS version 14.0 and all
results reported are two-tailed.
Results
Reverse reward contingency
Three out of six individuals showed a signiWcant preference
for the plate with the large reward during the Wrst 50 trials
(Fig. 2). In detail, when the Wrst of two plates was with-
drawn, Mi choose the larger reward in 52% of times (Bino-
mial test, x = 26, P > 0.05) and El in 62% of times (x = 31,
P > 0.05). When two equal sized plates were exchanged,
Ma chose the larger reward in 56% of times (x = 28,
Table 1 Summary of the four diVerent experimental procedures with two individuals tested per procedure
In procedures 1–3 the preferred reward was determined by the number of items on two plates while in procedure 4, shrimps were preferred over
Xakes. The plate sizes could be equal or diVerent. In order to reward the test subject contrary to what it had chosen, the Wrst plate was withdrawn
so the Wsh had access to the second one in procedure 1. In procedures 2-4, both plates were exchanged so the subjects received the reverse reward
Procedure Reward Plate size Plates Individuals
1 1 or 4 items Equal First withdrawn Mi, El
2 1 or 4 items Equal Exchanged Ma, Am
3 1 or 4 items Small versus large Exchanged Bo, Wa
4 Shrimps or Xakes Equal Exchanged Ci, Ch
Fig. 2 Percentage of trials in which individuals chose the preferred re-
ward during the Wrst 50 trials (Wlled bars) and during the last 50 trials
(open bars) in the reverse-reward contingency test. The 50% line cor-
responds to random choice. Dotted lines at 66% (x = 33) and 34%
(x = 17) indicate threshold values for signiWcant deviation from
random. Letters are individual codes for the test subjects. The numbers
1–4 indicate the experimental situation (for details see Table 1)
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Anim Cogn (2010) 13:41–49 45P > 0.05) and Am in 68% of times (x = 34, P < 0.001).
When two diVerent sized plates were exchanged (the larger
plate contained 4 items of shrimp), Bo chose the large plate
in 76% (x = 38, P < 0.001) and Wa in 86% of trials (x = 43,
P < 0.001). Both individuals that were choosing between
two diVerent types of food (shrimps or Xakes) showed a
preference for shrimps. Ci choose shrimps in 78% of times
(x = 39, P < 0.05) and Ch in 80% of times (x = 40,
P < 0.001).
Most individuals who showed a signiWcant preference
for one of both plates did so too after 100 trials (Table 2).
However, one of these individuals (Am) did not signiW-
cantly prefer the plate with four rewards after 100 trials and
one individual (El) only showed a signiWcant preference for
the large reward after 100 trials but not after 50 trials.
During the last 50 of the 200 trials in the reverse
reward task, none of the eight individuals signiWcantly fed
against a preference (Fig. 2). Two individuals maintained
their preference (Wa and Ch) while all other individuals
were not choosing diVerently than would be expected
from random choice. In detail, Mi and El feed without
preference for one of both plates (Mi choosing the plate
with more reward in 52% of cases (Binomial test, x = 26,
P > 0.05) and El in 48% of the trials (x = 24, P > 0.05)).
Ma chose the larger reward in 62% of times (x = 31,
P > 0.05) and Am in 58% of the trials (x = 29, P > 0.05),
Bo did not continue to chose the larger reward (52% of
choices for the large reward (x = 26, P > 0.05) but Wa sig-
niWcantly chose the larger reward (90% of choices for the
large reward (x = 45, P < 0.001)). Ci chose the plate with
shrimp instead of Xakes in 64% of trials (x = 32, P > 0.05)
and Ch in 88% of trials during the last 50 trials (x = 44,
P < 0.001).
Three individuals developed a side preference. Ma
selected the plate on the left side in 42.5% (85) of the trials
(Chi-square test, N = 200; 2 = 4.5; DF = 1; P < 0.05), Mi
in 88% (176) of the trials (N = 200; 2 = 115.5; DF = 1;
P < 0.001) and Bo in 76% (152) of trials (N = 200;
2 = 54.1; DF = 1; P < 0.001). All other individuals did not
show a signiWcant side preference.
Large-or-none contingency
During the Wrst 50 trials in the large or none contingency
task, three individuals preferentially chose the plate with
the large reward and Wve did not feed diVerently than would
be expected from random choice (Fig. 3). In detail, Mi
(48% of choices for the large reward, x = 24), El (44%,
x = 22), Ma (54%, x = 27), Bo (56%, x = 28) and Ci (48%,
x = 24) feed without preference for one of both plates
(Binomial tests, P > 0.05) while Am (70%, x = 35), Wa
(90%, x = 45) and Ch (72%, x = 36) preferred to feed from
the plate with the large reward (all results P < 0.01).
During the last block of 50 trials one individual (El) was
signiWcantly choosing the plate with one food item in order
to obtain the large reward (Fig. 3). Three individuals con-
tinued to preferentially choose the plate with the large
reward while the other four individuals continued to choose
randomly. In detail, El was choosing signiWcantly more
often the plate without reward (Binomial test, 8% of
choices for plate with large reward, x = 4, p < 0.001). Mi
(52%, x = 26), Ma (52%, x = 26), Bo (60%, x = 30) and Ci
(58%, x = 29) feed without preference for one of both
plates (all results P > 0.05) while Am (78%, x = 39), Wa
(78%, x = 39) and Ch (70%, x = 35) continued to prefer to
feed from the plate with the large reward (all results
P < 0.01).
Three individuals developed a side preference. Ma
selected the plate on the left side in 95% (190) of the trials
(Chi-square test, N = 200; 2 = 162.0; DF = 1; P < 0.001),
Mi in 99% (198) of the trials (N = 200; 2 = 192.1; DF = 1;
P < 0.001), Bo in 65% (130) of the trials (N = 200; 2 = 18;
DF = 1; P < 0.001).
Table 2 Initial food choice after diVerent periods of testing
The table shows the number of times individuals chose a plate with ei-
ther four items of prawn instead of one, or prawn instead of Xakes after
50 and 100 trials. SigniWcance levels for food preferences are depicted
as °P < 0.1, *P < 0.05 or **P < 0.01 (binomial tests)
Mi El Ma Am Bo Wa Ci Ch
N trials
50 26 31 28 34* 38** 43** 39** 40**
100 45 64** 55 60° 72** 90** 67** 73**
Four over one item of prawn Prawn over Xakes
Fig. 3 Percentage of trials in which individuals chose the preferred re-
ward during the Wrst 50 trials (Wlled bars) and during the last 50 trials
(open bars) in the large-or-none contingency test. The 50% line corre-
sponds to random choice. Dotted lines at 66% (x = 33) and 34%
(x = 17) indicate threshold values for signiWcant deviation from ran-
dom. Letters are individual codes for the test subjects. The numbers
1–4 indicate the experimental situation (for details see Table 1)
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Only one individual (El) succeeded in choosing signiW-
cantly the non-rewarding plate in order to get access to the
large reward and was subsequently again subjected to the
reverse reward task. After the re-experience procedure, El
chose according to random expectation during the Wrst
three sessions and subsequently chose signiWcantly more
the small reward in order to obtain a large reward in three
successive sessions (Fig. 4).
Discussion
Ecological versus anthropocentric approach
The two main approaches in the cognition literature make
opposite predictions as to whether cleaners should be able
to solve the reverse-reward contingency task. Scientists
who emphasise the role of phylogenetic relationships
would predict that Wshes are too distantly related to humans
(presumably the animal with the most ‘complex’ cognitive
abilities) and hence should be incapable of solving the task
(anthropocentric approach). In contrast, the ecological
approach to cognition predicts that an animal’s ability to
solve a speciWc problem should be tightly linked to its eco-
logical need to solve such a problem. Therefore, cleaners
should be able to master a reverse reward preference task.
Neither approach can fully explain our results.
In favour of the ecological approach, we provide some
evidence suggesting that a Wsh can solve the reverse reward
contingency task. We predicted that cleaners should be able
to solve a reverse reward contingency task, based on the
fact that cleaners can control impulsive behaviour in a
diVerent situation, i.e. when they feed against their prefer-
ence in interactions with client reef Wsh (Grutter and Bshary
2003; Bshary and Grutter 2005; Bshary et al. 2007; Bshary
et al. 2008).
In favour of the anthropocentric approach, we note that
no individual learned to solve the task within 200 trials (as
has been the case for most primate species as well (Murray
et al. 2005)). Moreover, while it is not possible to exclude
that they would have mastered the task after more trials (as
has been shown for rhesus macaques; Murray et al. 2005),
only one individual developed a signiWcant preference for
the correct solution in the large or none situation, which is
in contrast to the high levels of success observed in several
primate species (Silberberg and Fujita 1996; Anderson
et al. 2000; Genty et al. 2004).
One individual (El) may have transferred its knowledge
from the large or none to a subsequent reverse reward test.
This may provide some evidence that cleaner Wsh as a spe-
cies may have the potential to solve the reverse reward task.
Methodological considerations
Previous studies did not attempt to exclude the possibility
that individuals just continued with their choice behaviour
after the large or none situation without realising a change
in the reward condition. Therefore, as far as we are aware,
our study has a methodological advantage because we
introduced a re-experience procedure between the large or
none task and the second reverse reward task. In this proce-
dure the individuals had the possibility to experience the
value of both plates, i.e. with one and four rewards before
being subjected to the reverse reward test. As the successful
individual El started to choose the small reward after 30 tri-
als of initial random choice, it may indeed have learned to
solve the reverse reward task after a large or none task.
However, we cannot conclude with certainty that El indeed
chose against a preference because the short extinction
phase only caused random choices rather than a choice of
the large reward. Therefore, El might have retained infor-
mation from the previous large or none procedure, i.e. El
might have used the white marks on the plates as a cue
where to swim. Future studies should involve a longer re-
experience phase than 10 trials only, and make attempts to
assure extinction before returning to the reverse reward
contingency procedure.
Most of the tested individuals developed a clear prefer-
ence for four over one items of prawn, or for prawn over
Xakes. However, two individuals did not develop a signiW-
cant food preference and El showed a clear preference for
four items only after 100 trials. DiVerent levels of acclima-
tisation to the experimental conditions might explain these
Fig. 4 Percentage of trials per session (10 trials per session) El was
choosing reward 4 in a a large-or-none contingency task and b the re-
verse reward contingency task. A re-experience procedure (de-condi-
tioning) preceded the reverse reward contingency task. The (solid)
50% line corresponds to random choice and all values equal or below
the 10% line (dotted line) show choice behaviour that signiWcantly
diVers from random expectation (binomial test, N = 10, x = 1,
P < 0.05)
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Anim Cogn (2010) 13:41–49 47results. Such eVects may cause undesired behaviours such
as the development of a side preference which could
explain the lack of a food preference in two individuals (Ma
and Mi) and the Wnding that individual El showed a clear
preference for the large reward only after 100 trials.
Although we aimed at minimising the development of side
preferences by randomising the plate position and by con-
structing a corridor so the Wsh needed to swim in the middle
of the tank, three individuals developed a signiWcant side
preference, both in the reverse reward and the large or none
contingency task. This might have precluded these individ-
uals from succeeding in the task. Future studies should aim
at further reducing the factors that favour the development
of a side preference, for instance, by using only one plate in
the centre of the tank.
Finally, as cleaners in nature appear to feed against a
preference due to punishment (either a cheated client may
leave the cleaning station or attack the cheating cleaner),
future experiments may try to emphasize the punishment
aspect within the reverse reward paradigm to make it more
similar to the situation under natural conditions.
We assume that the task in our experiment was actually
more diYcult to solve than the reverse reward task for pri-
mates. This is because primates sitting in front of both
options only need to reach out for the smaller reward with
their hands. As cleaners do not have extremities to indicate
their choice, they needed to swim towards one of the two
plates with food. Therefore, they needed to swim away
from the more attractive item and approach the less attrac-
tive item in order to solve the task. This subtle but perhaps
important diVerence might explain why cleaners largely
failed in the reverse reward contingency task, while they
can easily learn to feed on a non preferred food item from a
plate when a preferred item is present on the same plate in
1 cm distance (Bshary and Grutter 2005; Bshary and
Grutter 2006). In these earlier experiments, each subject
was allowed to continue to feed on a plate with two types of
food as long as it continued to feed on the non-preferred
item (Xakes). However, when the subject fed on a preferred
item (prawn) the plate was withdrawn.
Our low total sample size of eight individuals precludes
any statistical analysis on whether the four diVerent experi-
mental designs had any inXuence on the performance of the
subjects. We do not see any intuitive explanation why the
experimental setup in the conditions of the successful individ-
ual (the reward plate was behind the chosen plate, the latter
was removed as soon as the Wsh had chosen) should be more
suitable for cleaner Wsh than the other three alternatives.
Does the reverse reward task test for “self control”?
Initially, studies on impulse control were mainly performed
with humans (Mischel et al. 1989; Russell et al. 1991) and
primates (Boysen and Berntson 1995; Boysen et al. 1996;
Silberberg and Fujita 1996; Kralik et al. 2002; Genty et al.
2004). Some authors have suggested that success in the
reverse reward task may be interpreted as a form of “self
control” thereby implying that in order to solve the task,
some “awareness of self” needs to be involved (e.g. Genty
et al. 2004). In line with this argument, our results suggest
that solving a reverse reward contingency task is diYcult
even for a species with an ecology that selects for the ability
to feed against a food preference. On the other hand, the
observation that cleaners apparently show some potential to
solve the reverse reward task suggests that seemingly com-
plex behaviours might not necessarily require an overly
complex explanation such as the concept of self awareness
(Bshary et al. 2007). Instead, we propose the ability to solve
a reverse reward task may result from an evolved Xexibility
in learning that originates from selection due to the chal-
lenges animals face in their natural environment. The under-
lying mechanism behind this ability may diVer depending on
whether primates or Wshes are the focus of interest. Further-
more, contrary to what we assumed, the ecology of cleaners
may not Wt to the requirements of the reverse reward task.
Although cleaners often feed on ectoparasites instead of the
more preferred mucus, if given the choice under natural con-
ditions, they would usually approach the more attractive cli-
ent (Bshary 2001). In contrast, predators such as sea lions,
may Wnd it particularly easy to approach the smaller reward
in such a test situation as the hunting success of many preda-
tors relies on their ability to isolate a single prey from its
group in order to avoid confusion eVects (Landeau and
Terborgh 1986; Ruxton et al. 2008). The hunting technique
of chasing after isolated prey provides a straightforward
ecological explanation for the sea lions’ ability to solve the
reverse reward task (Genty and Roeder 2006). For the
future, it would therefore be interesting to repeat the test,
both in non predators (including primates) and in predators
(including Wsh species), to test whether approaching a less
preferred food item is particularly diYcult for non-predators
compared to predators.
Finally, after the surprising Wnding that many primates
have diYculties in refraining from the larger amount in
order to obtain a small one (Boysen and Berntson 1995),
many subsequent studies focussed on procedures that help
the test subjects to overcome this problem. However, this
approach may distract from an important question, i.e. to
understand the prevalence and the evolutionary roots of
succeeding in such a task in animals. An ecological
approach might help to understand why many primate spe-
cies initially fail in this task despite their highly developed
cognitive skills. Ultimately, to understand the prevailing
variation in such cognitive abilities we will need compara-
tive studies in which a suYcient number of species with a
diVerent ecology can be subjected to the same tasks.123
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The evolution and maintenance of cooperative behaviour is
likely constrained by the cognitive abilities in the species
concerned (Stevens and Hauser 2004; Stevens et al. 2005).
This is particularly important in case individuals interact in
reciprocal interactions, where the act of cooperating
reduces the immediate payoVs for the actor and is hence an
investment that often only yields beneWts in the future
(Bergmüller et al. 2007a, b; Bshary and Bergmüller 2008).
Under these conditions, animals may require the capacity
for individual recognition, low temporal discounting
(Stevens and Hauser 2004), book keeping of past interactions
with partners, and, as we suggest here, the ability to control
impulsive behaviour in reverse reward choice situations.
An important future research question in the Weld of cogni-
tion in the context of cooperation is therefore to investigate
how the ability to control impulsive behaviour is linked to
the ability of low temporal discounting, and how past expe-
rience with a partner (positive or negative) inXuences
impulsive behaviour.
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